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From social distancing to social containment: reimagining sociality for the coronavirus 
pandemic 
 
 
Abstract 
This essay develops an anthropological critique of ‘social distancing’. While the 2020 
coronavirus pandemic requires us to reconfigure our established forms of sociality, 
‘distancing’ or ‘locking down’ is not the only way this can be done. It carries high costs and 
is not easily sustainable long-term. We must therefore imagine new ways of living and 
socialising alongside each other whilst simultaneously containing the spread coronavirus. I 
call this strategy one of ‘social containment’, and offer some hypothetical and ethnographic 
examples of how it can be done.  
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Introduction 
‘Social distancing’ has emerged as the principal line of defence in humanity’s fight against 
the novel coronavirus. The logic behind this is compelling and clear. Since people infected by 
the coronavirus can transmit it for up to 5 days before their symptoms manifest, or even 
transmit it asymptomatically, reducing social interactions between even ostensibly healthy 
people stands to dramatically slow the spread of the virus. Critical cases can thus remain at a 
sufficiently low number to be efficaciously treated in intensive care units.  
In the United Kingdom, where I have been based as the coronavirus pandemic 
unfolds, modelling by Ferguson et al. (2020, 13) indicates that policy measures that 
incorporate ‘general social distancing’ (alongside case isolation, household quarantine and/or 
school and university closure) stand to reduce the total number of deaths by between 78 and 
99 percent, depending on the exact combination of measures introduced and the reproduction 
number of the virus. ‘General social distancing’ is here defined as ‘all households reduc[ing] 
contact outside [the] household, school or workplace by 75%’, workplace contact rates 
reducing by 25 percent, household contact rates increasing by 25 percent, and school contact 
rates remaining unchanged.  
Informed by this model, the UK’s prime minister, Boris Johnson, announced on 16 
March 2020 that it was ‘time for everyone to stop non-essential contact with others,’ 
encouraging people to work from home and avoid ‘social venues’ such as pubs, clubs, and 
theatres. Those considered especially vulnerable to the complications of COVID-19, such as 
the elderly, were advised to observe such measures particularly stringently, having already 
been warned by Health Secretary Matt Hancock that they would soon be asked to ‘self-
isolate… to stay at home to protect themselves’ for several months. This supplemented a 
longer-standing mandate for those displaying hallmark symptoms of COVID-19 to 
quarantine themselves, a requirement now extended to everyone in their household.  
The epidemiological effectiveness of these measures is clear. But so are their costs. I 
thus have three goals in this think piece: to understand why ‘social distancing’ exerts such a 
toll, to problematize the foundational assumptions underpinning the discourse of ‘social 
distancing’, and to draw on ethnographic and hypothetical examples to imagine how we 
could live together otherwise in the time of coronavirus. 
 
The costs of social distancing 
The introduction of social distancing measures in the UK and elsewhere has rapidly fuelled 
concerns about the damage they would wreak – economically, but also psychologically. 
Quarantine could heighten anxiety; isolation could lead to depression (Faris 2020; Rubin and 
Wessely 2020). Official government advice, and much that has been published in the media, 
encourages citizens to experiment with the opportunities digital technologies offer for 
socialising in alternative ways.1 Notwithstanding the fact that access to such technologies is 
unevenly distributed (Blank et al. 2020), the benefits of such interactions will also be 
unevenly felt. Relationships in which physical presence features heavily – such as those with 
young children – stand to suffer disproportionate damage. Those who live alone are 
especially disadvantaged, deprived as they will be of the multiple benefits that come from 
physical co-presence with others (see e.g. Baldassar 2008, 260-263; Bowlby 2011; Urry 
2002), whereas those who live in (hetero)normative nuclear households continue to enjoy 
affirming everyday interactions with family. Social distancing encourages a calculative 
attitude towards others – is contact with this person really ‘essential’? – that threatens to 
strain many relationships and injure individuals’ self-worth, especially in cases where contact 
that is ‘essential’ to one party may not be seen as such by the other. And the pressures of 
long-term co-residence in close confinement are not to be discounted either, especially when 
parents must combine the demands of working from home with those of caring for children 
whose schools have closed.  
Such harms are not just existential; they are also epidemiologically consequential: if 
life with social distancing proves intolerable, then subjects will simply not comply with 
government directives. Dulcie Williams, a 79-year old from Cornwall, articulates this point 
especially poignantly. Her age puts her at high risk of COVID-19 complications; the policy 
response seeks to protect people like her. But preservation of life is not necessarily her own 
top priority. ‘I haven’t yet decided if I will keep to full self-isolation,’ she reflects, ‘I might 
well find that life is no longer worth living if I can’t see my loved ones’ (Hill 2020, emphasis 
mine).  
 To date, the predominant response to these various concerns has been to insist on 
self-work and forbearance, arguing that some people have to make greater sacrifices than 
others in order to achieve a collective good. This approach is exemplified in its softest forms 
by well-intentioned suggestions to cultivate a more resilient self through practices such as 
mindfulness and exercise (e.g. Ripley 2020). Its underlying logic, though, is laid bare in the 
policed lockdowns and suspension of human freedoms occurring in many parts of the world: 
‘put up and shut up’. While such an outlook is understandable, perhaps even essential in the 
face of particularly dramatic COVID-19 case surges, it hardly seems optimal. Nor is it 
necessarily sustainable, given projections that social distancing measures may need to be 
maintained for months or years, until effective vaccines or antivirals are available 
But the remarkable thing about human sociality is that we have the capacity to 
imagine how it might be enacted otherwise (Long and Moore 2013). It is therefore incumbent 
upon us to consider how social interaction might be practiced in better, more fulfilling, and 
yet epidemiologically responsible ways during these unprecedented times. This also requires 
critically analysing the assumptions built into the concept of ‘social distancing’ as currently 
presented. By thinking differently about how we socialise, and what is at stake, existentially 
and epidemiologically, in our interactions, it might just be possible to initiate forms of 
sociality that safeguard lives worth living whilst blocking the spread of the novel 
coronavirus. To do this, I suggest we move away from our current preoccupation with social 
distancing and focus instead on the prospect of social containment.  
 
Conceptual problems with ‘social distancing’ discourse 
On 14 March 2020, The Washington Post published an article that influenced the way many 
people envisaged ‘social distancing’ as a solution to the coronavirus pandemic (Stevens 
2020). It presented a series of animated diagrams tracking the spread of a fictional disease, 
dubbed ‘simulitis’, within a town of 200 people. Each healthy person was depicted as a blue 
dot, moving at random, periodically colliding with other dots. Once one brown dot with 
simulitis was introduced to the population, any dot it collided with would become ‘infected’, 
turning brown until it ‘recovered’ and became purple. With no interventions in place, the 
whole population quickly contracted simulitis. An attempted quarantine slowed, but could not 
avert, this process. By contrast, when three-quarters or seven-eighths of the population 
practiced ‘social distancing’ – represented in this model by remaining stationary, while other 
dots continued to move, not only did the rate of case growth slow significantly but much of 
the population escaped infection altogether. Stevens admitted the model ‘vastly 
oversimplified the complexity of human life’ and that coronavirus did not necessarily behave 
the same way as simulitis. Nevertheless, he claimed, ‘just as simulitis spread through the 
networks of bouncing balls on your screen, covid-19 is spreading through our human 
networks… And, like a ball bouncing across the screen, a single person’s behavior can cause 
ripple effects that touch faraway people.’ 
 What is striking about this claim is the way that ‘social distancing’ as a practice is 
presented as an individualised behaviour, despite the acknowledgement that the spread of 
coronavirus is fundamentally a problem to do with human networks. Or, more accurately, it 
encouraged readers to view their individual behaviours in relation to one single macro-
network: the wider population, typically the nation. Such logic has been widely invoked in 
recent days: political leaders have justified social distancing and lockdowns with the 
nationalistic rhetoric of ‘wartime’ sacrifice; friends on social media post selfies from their 
living rooms whilst exhorting their contacts to ‘do your civic duty and #stayathome’ 
(emphasis mine). 
Fighting against coronavirus is thus being imagined as the adoption of radical 
asociality, epitomised by lockdown and immobilisation, whether enforced or voluntary. The 
meritorious citizen remains spatially confined and static, much like the dots in the 
Washington Post simulation. The distinct (albeit related) concepts of social distancing, self-
isolation and quarantine have become interchangeable in common parlance, and are all 
conceptualised as practices undertaken at the level of the self. Social interaction, meanwhile, 
is becoming conceptualised as something both generalizable and quantifiable: an ‘input’ into 
one’s life that could be reduced (by, say, 75 percent): at best a guilty pleasure, at worst an 
unnecessary risk. While such ways of looking at things have undoubtedly been helpful in 
prompting complacent citizens to reflect critically upon their engrained habits, and in 
highlighting the gravity of our current situation, it is far from clear that it they are optimal 
social science – or optimal epidemiology. 
Though Euro-American folk models may sometimes encourage citizens to imagine 
themselves as autonomous individuals within populations, few human beings move 
(randomly or otherwise) across a whole population. Their existence within the national social 
matrix is circumscribed by obligation and habit. For many, the people with whom they are 
likely to spend 15 minutes or longer in close contact (the criteria considered most likely for 
direct coronavirus transmission2) are relatively few: colleagues, family members, flatmates, 
friends. Since, under normal circumstances, all of these people are themselves regularly 
interacting with their own colleagues, family members, flatmates and friends, such 
encounters can quickly lead to the uncontrolled spread of coronavirus – hence the need for 
interventions. What is problematic about our default patterns of social interaction, then, is not 
the brute fact of social interaction – essential or otherwise – but rather the way that the 
rhythms and volatility of regular social interaction lead to a tremendous number of different 
people getting connected up in a transmission chain. Recognising this clarifies the key 
criteria that render an intervention effective. It should reduce any given individual’s chances 
of contracting coronavirus, and/or lead the virus into an epidemiological ‘dead-end’, where it 
has a very low chance of being transmitted to others in the population.  
 Practices of the kind currently recommended by the UK government clearly achieve 
both of these objectives, but they do so in subtly different ways. Working from home, for 
example, removes citizens from crowded workplaces where a single infected employee could 
unknowingly transmit the virus to many colleagues in one fell swoop. Here, a calculated act 
of social withdrawal slows (but does not necessarily stop) ongoing transmission of the 
pathogen. A slightly different mechanism is at work when households collectively quarantine 
after a member exhibits symptoms. Such quarantines involve a collective co-ordination of 
social behaviour within a network to ensure that the virus will not be transmitted further. 
Although they could be viewed as ‘social distancing’ or ‘self-isolation’ because the 
household will not interact with others during the 14-day quarantine period, they could 
equally be thought of as a form of social containment. Quarantines are effective because they 
give the virus nowhere to go. Their efficacy in this regard is fundamentally a collaborative 
accomplishment.  
This point is of crucial importance to how we envisage and design coronavirus 
response when it comes to ‘non-essential’ social contact. While the rhetoric of ‘social 
distancing’ leads us to view our social interactions with others as a threat to both us and 
them, encouraging a strategy of radical withdrawal and raising the frightening prospect of 
loneliness and atomisation, a language of social containment allows us to see our network of 
relationships as tools that we can collaboratively manipulate in order to contain and control 
the virus’s spread whilst still enjoying the varied companionship we need for a life worth 
living.  
 
Possibilities for social containment 
Quarantine practices and martial lockdown policies naturalise ‘the household’ as the default 
social network of epidemiological significance, but there is no reason why this has to be the 
case. Relatives, friends, and others who are valued despite being ‘non-essential’ can also be 
incorporated into containment networks, provided their incorporation follows certain 
principles – largely to do with timing and pacing. To develop this idea further, let’s imagine a 
case where a family of A, B and C – all working from home – want to meet up with three 
cherished friends, D, E, and F who all live alone and are also work from home.  
Scenario 1. Conscious of the transmission risks associated with gatherings, A, B and 
C invite all three of D, E and F over for dinner on separate occasions within a two-week 
period. If these were their only social appointments, this could feel, to A, B and C, like a very 
successful form of social distancing, in which contact with the wider world had been 
minimised but some important relationships maintained. For D, E and F, however, the 
dinners offer only fleeting relief from their ongoing isolation, which they must either endure 
with great sufferance or combat by scheduling additional appointments. If they do the latter 
then there is a very real risk that A, B or C could contract coronavirus from D and pass it on, 
presymptomatically, to E and F, who might then pass it on to others. The overall case rate 
would be far lower than if these people were all active in their workplaces, or attending mass 
gatherings – the ‘social distancing’ approach has thus indeed managed to ‘slow the spread’. 
Yet, overall, it has not been particularly successful at either containing the virus or providing 
social sustenance to its loneliest members. 
Scenario 2. A, B and C take the view that if D is coming to visit, she might as well be 
a house guest for some time, offering exclusive use of their spare room or sofa (if they have 
either) for a couple of weeks, before the room was offered to E the following fortnight, and F 
the fortnight after that. If D transmitted the coronavirus asymptomatically, and none of A, B 
or C displayed symptoms themselves, current medical knowledge suggests there is 
nevertheless a good chance their immune systems would have fought off the virus by the time 
D departed and E arrived. Even if they had not, the only person who stands to be infected by 
them is E, who, by virtue of staying with A, B and C for a whole two weeks, is most unlikely 
to transmit the infection to anyone else. Such an arrangement successfully contains the virus, 
whilst also allowing A, B and C to spend much more time with each of D, E and F than under 
Scenario 1. 
Of course, not everyone has a spare room, or has circumstances that can 
accommodate a house guest. In Scenario 3, A, B and C set up a ‘coronavirus contract’, 
agreeing they will exclusively socialise with D for a period of fourteen days, and then with E 
for fourteen days, and then with F. During this time, they can enjoy time together and time 
apart as and when they need it, but the network remains one that will contain any coronavirus 
that is introduced to a group of four – so long as that the whole network quarantines at the 
point that any member exhibits symptoms, even if they are distributed across different 
households at the time. Modest additional risk could arise from the travel between their 
respective residences if public transport were used – but this could be substantially mitigated 
via stringent hygiene routines and by travelling at off-peak hours. Scenario 4 is a variation of 
Scenario 3. It assumes that D, E and F are all friends with each other, as well as with A, B 
and C, and that the six friends agree that, for a period of two weeks, they will socialise 
exclusively with each other, but in various combinations, on the proviso that if coronavirus 
symptoms manifest, then all six of them will collectively quarantine in their respective 
residences.  
What we see in all these cases, but perhaps most especially Scenario 4, is quite the 
reverse of the austere image associated with social distancing. In fact, the figures in this study 
can enjoy a vibrant and relatively varied social life, with large amounts of ‘non-essential’ 
social contact, precisely because that contact takes place in a way that has been designed to 
maximise social containment. Such an approach even has the potential to accommodate those 
at the greatest risk of coronavirus complications, such as the elderly, provided that their 
visitors or hosts have undergone a suitable period of exclusive socialisation with others prior 
to undertaking exclusive socialisation with them and can thus be reliably envisaged as 
coronavirus free. Questions remain as to the limits of what is practicable – containment 
networks need to be small enough that they can be easily envisaged and compliance with 
exclusivity largely assured. But if citizens begin discussing such possibilities and 
practicalities with the people that matter to them, they stand to enjoy a much more rewarding 
life during the pandemic than by enacting a defensive retreat to the household.  
 
From the hypothetical to the ethnographic 
The scenarios presented above are, of course, oversimplified. It may be very difficult in 
practice to ensure that any of A, B, C, D, E or F are so sealed off from the world that viral 
containment is fully guaranteed. Nevertheless, juxtaposing these hypothetical scenarios 
proves helpful for illustrating the comparative risk associated with each of them. It is thus 
striking that onward transmission is far less likely under Scenarios 2 - 4 than it is under 
Scenario 1, even though it is the latter that best conforms to current guidance and imaginaries 
regarding ‘social distancing’. 
While they are hypothetical scenarios rather than ethnographic case studies, they are 
inspired by and responsive to the very real dilemmas that people in London have shared with 
me in recent days. One such person was Jack.3  
2020 had been going well for Jack. He was enjoying work and dating a new 
boyfriend, Alex, who lived nearby. But as the coronavirus outbreak gathered pace, he became 
very anxious about his job security. Then then his flatmate Poppy developed a cough.  
Jack described himself as feeling ‘overwhelmed’ by the situation. Poppy’s cough was 
chesty and productive, so it seemed unlikely to be COVID-19, but with no tests available to 
confirm this, Jack had to quarantine himself for fourteen days. But this would mean 
subjecting his new relationship to a two-week hiatus precisely at a time he most needed 
emotional support. Alex had been very unhappy at the prospect of the separation, Jack 
worried whether the relationship could survive the time apart. He considered moving in with 
Alex, who lived alone, but feared this might also put a lot of pressure on the relationship, 
while leaving Poppy bereft of company. He felt ‘torn’. 
He decided the best way to proceed was for him to shuttle between his flat and 
Alex’s, with Alex also putting himself in a fourteen-day isolation. Jack could reach Alex’s 
flat by walking through residential back-streets, wearing face-masks and avoiding passers-by 
as he did so, keeping whatever pathogen was responsible for Poppy’s cough contained within 
their three-person network. Such a practice initially appears to defy common-sense notions of 
‘quarantine’ – although Public Health England do allow people in quarantine to leave their 
homes ‘for exercise’. From Jack’s point of view, though, he and Alex had creatively and 
collaboratively reinvented what it meant to be ‘in quarantine’ so as to minimise any risk to 
public health whilst safeguarding relationships they cared about and relied upon at a 
frightening time. 
People like Jack understand that their actions have consequences for population 
health; they take this seriously. But they are also painfully aware that their actions can have 
consequences for specific others, and this informs their behaviour too. It can lead them to 
abandon austere practices of ‘self-isolation’ and ‘social distancing’ in favour of more creative 
strategies that appear, to them, to address both public health and personal imperatives. Of 
course, they are not epidemiologists; their strategies are not necessarily well-judged. This is 
where medical anthropologists and public health scholars can play an important role. Rather 
than deeming them ‘non-compliant’ and re-emphasising the importance of minimising 
contact, we can instead harness and direct their creative energies, offering advice, inspiration 
and guidelines for strategies that might prove effective. Scenarios such as those outlined 
above offer a few possibilities for getting such conversations started. 
 
Conclusion 
The rhetoric of ‘social distancing’ has usefully heightened popular consciousness of how 
individual actions can affect population health, driving people away from spaces posing high 
levels of epidemiological risk. However, the current emphasis on ‘distance’ and ‘isolation’ 
has led to portfolios of measures so unpalatable that they may be rejected as ‘unliveable’ by 
the very people they are designed to protect, only coming to fruition if repressive state force 
literally coerces people to stay within their homes. We must do better. Public health discourse 
needs to combine an emphasis on what citizens mustn’t do with positive visions for how 
people could reconfigure the ebbs and flows of their interactions in ways that safeguard the 
relationships that make life worth preserving. Social scientists, epidemiologists and artists 
can all help in this endeavour. The double scourge of the coronavirus and the draconian 
measures adopted to suppress its spread can be radically challenged by developing a social 
imagination which allows us to view our relationships not as threats to health, but as 
resources we can draw on in collaborative practices of social containment.  
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